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Much has been made of “special and differential” treatment in the Doha Development 
Round of WTO negotiations. In particular, a conscious effort has been made to infer 
that special and differential treatment will promote development. While special and 
differential treatment may be a necessary evil given developing countries’ higher 
adjustment costs, dignifying it as a development mechanism plays into the hands of 
protectionist interests. In particular, by allowing a general increase in the ability of 
developing countries to isolate their economies, it may reduce the efficacy of important 
forces that prod institutional reforms in developing countries. As institutional reform is 
one of the keys to economic development, lionizing special and differential treatment 
in the WTO is likely to be counterproductive.    
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2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all 
our peoples to benefit from increased opportunities and welfare that the 
multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are 
developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the 
heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration. … [W]e shall 
continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of economic 
development. 
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 2001a) 
 
44. We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an 
integral part of the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns expressed 
regarding their operation in addressing specific constraints faced by 
developing countries, particularly least-developed countries. … We 
therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall 
be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more 
precise, effective and operational.  
Work Programme,  
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 2001a) 
 
A 
s a multilateral organization that requires consensus among numerous members 
that have disparate objectives and agendas, it is not surprising that the official 
pronouncements of the World Trade Organization sometimes exhibit internal 
inconsistencies. In some cases, these inconsistencies have little impact on the efficacy 
of the underlying agreements, the ability of the Secretariat to undertake its work or the 
evolution of the organization through negotiations. In other cases, such as the one 
illustrated by the quotes above from the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the 
inconsistency both is egregious and hobbles the organization in its pursuit of one of its 
core objectives – in this case trade liberalization. 
Attempting to dignify the “special and differential” treatment granted to 
developing and least-developed countries as a mechanism that fosters or facilitates the 
contribution trade can make to economic development not only is spurious but also 
plays into the hands of protectionists. It is wise to remember that the major reason the 
influence of protectionist interests has waned over the last half century is that they 
have been stripped of their intellectual legitimacy (Kerr and Perdikis, 1995). The long 
intellectual battle that disassociated protectionism from society’s interests was won 
through the rigorous examination by economists of theories that advocated restrictions 
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on trade. Starting with Adam Smith’s devastating attack on “mercantilism” in 1776,
1 
protectionist arguments such as “distortions in commodity or factor markets”, 
“domestic full employment”, “stable exchange rates”, “national security”, “revenue-
raising tariff”, “infant industry”, “senile industry”, “infant economy”, “import 
substitution industrialization”, etc. have been debunked by economists, for example, 
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), Hindley (1983), Winters (1990), Baldwin (1969), 
Flanders (1964), Morgan (1959) and a host of others including those who work for 
multilateral organizations (IBRD, 1987).
2 The rigorous refinement of neoclassical 
trade theory over the last century has created a powerful logic that is widely accepted 
among members of the economics profession, as well as more generally, due to its 
having become the dominant paradigm in economics education pertaining to 
international trade.
3 It is also the economic model that underlies the WTO (Isaac and 
Kerr, 2003).
4 The result has been that requests for protection have been fully exposed 
and understood as pandering to vested interests. The absence of “social legitimacy” 
has made obtaining protection through the political process much more difficult and 
costly; hence, this absence has assisted the long-term trend toward liberalization of 
trade that has taken place over the last half-century.  
One fundamental lesson of the long debate surrounding free trade versus 
protectionism is that while protectionists may suffer local setbacks, they are never 
vanquished – the stakes are too high. Protectionists are worthy opponents, well able to 
exploit chinks in the armour of trade liberalization to their advantage. What they crave 
above all is the cloak of “social legitimacy” – to be able to have their particular cause 
associated with the “general good” rather than the narrow garnering of trade policy 
rents. Currently, this seeking of “social legitimacy” can be seen most blatantly in the 
rise of antidumping actions. Antidumping actions are dignified with legitimacy 
through the ability of those initiating a case to brand those from whom protection is 
sought as “unfair” traders whose activities threaten legitimate domestic businesses, 
jobs and, sometimes, the viability of communities. The cachet of being able to accuse 
foreigners of “unfair” pricing practices, even when it is easy to show that the label is 
unwarranted in the vast majority of cases (Kerr, 2001), is extremely valuable for 
protectionists and, as a result, reform of antidumping policy is vociferously resisted 
even when less cumbersome, but transparently protectionist, alternative safeguards 
exist (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004). Other examples of protectionists seeking the “cloak 
of legitimacy” can be found in attempts to have clauses pertaining to “environmental 
standards” and “labour standards” included in regional trade agreements. While a 
variety of interests may want to have these “social goals” recognized in trade 
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agreements, often their most fervent supporters are labour unions with a vested 
interest in limiting foreign competition.  
Protectionists do not reside only in developed countries. Protectionist interests are 
equally likely to be present in developing countries. In fact, given rigidities in labour 
markets and other institutional failings in developing countries, the costs of 
adjustment associated with liberalization may be higher than in developed countries, 
leading to even larger incentives to pursue protectionism. Protectionists in developing 
countries are no different from their counterparts in developed countries in their 
craving for the “cloak of legitimacy”. Special and differential treatment at the WTO 
currently provides that legitimacy for protectionists in developing countries. 
Special and differential treatment may well be a political compromise necessary to 
bring developing countries to the table at the negotiations. It has long been recognized 
that developing countries may find the process of adjusting to declines in their 
international competitiveness more difficult to deal with because their labour forces 
are less well educated and therefore may be less able to transfer among industries as 
trade liberalization leads to the predicted adjustments associated with moving 
resources from relatively inefficient industries to relatively efficient industries. Given 
that the private costs of adjustment may be higher, and the resources available to 
mitigate those costs through retraining, relocation and social welfare payments are far 
fewer, concessions to developing countries may need to be made to allow, for 
example, longer transition periods or temporary trade barriers.
5 Special and 
differential treatment granted for these reasons is a result of not being fully developed 
as an economy – a concession to the political reality faced by trade policy makers in 
developing countries. This is a far cry from the deliberate association of special and 
differential treatment with economic development in the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(2001a). The declaration creates the impression of a strong (causal) association 
between special and differential treatment and economic development. This 
impression has opened the door to legitimization of protectionism as an adjunct or 
fosterer of economic development. For example, twelve developing countries
6 brought 
forward a Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment 
as part of the preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference (WTO, 
2001b). This document sought to further cement the idea of a causal relationship 
between special and differential treatment and economic development. WTO (2001b) 
states at various points: 
 Special and Differential treatment was based on the recognition that the 
developing countries were placed differently in international trade and that 
these difficulties as well as the imperative of promoting social and 
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economic development required that developing countries be treated 
differently in the Multilateral Trading System (emphasis added) (p. 2) 
There is an urgent need for such a S&D regime which mainly focuses on 
enhancing market opportunities (for developing countries) and provides 
policy options aimed at unlocking their growth and development potential. 
The guiding basis, therefore, should be that (i) the liberalisation of trade is 
not an end in itself but the means to an end, that is, economic growth and 
development of all Members and (ii) different levels of development 
achieved by members require different sets of policies to achieve economic 
growth and development (emphasis added) (p. 3) 
S&D treatment that facilitates developing countries to grow and develop 
will ultimately benefit all not just in terms of more and affluent markets 
but by ensuring a more peaceful world (emphasis added) (p. 3). 
Some of the elements which can form part of the Agreement on S&D 
could be as follows: … Without an evaluation of the fact that whether an 
Industrial Policy has a demonstrable adverse impact on trade, there shall 
be no prohibition of policies which promote growth and development in 
developing countries (emphasis added) (p. 4). 
 
The change in the status of special and differential treatment, from being a 
necessary evil arising from the political reality of trade policy making in developing 
countries to being a central focus of how trade policy can promote economic 
development, is a major coup for protectionist interests in developing countries.  
Special and differential treatment is antipathetic to the promotion of economic 
development. Stripped of its rhetoric, special and differential treatment for developing 
and least-developed countries is simply a polite term for protectionism. It is important 
to be able to separate the fact that a policy of trade liberalization will lead to some 
members of a society losing in the adjustments that must take place from the fact that 
the less transparent benefits that arise from the movement of resources between 
sectors will provide the efficiency – and welfare – gains expected. Protectionists are 
always better able to identify the potential losers from trade liberalization than those 
promoting integration into the global economy can point to potential winners. Further, 
as protectionists’ claims during debates over liberalization are seldom examined after 
the debates are over – either because they win the debate and liberalization does not 
take place or they do not prevail and the advocates of liberalization have no interest in 
examining the predictions of their adversaries – they are often able to amplify their 
predictions of doom (Kerr and Foregrave, 2002). Policy makers in developing 
countries may be more susceptible to protectionist arguments due to the narrower 
economic bases of their economies, and in particular their “modern” sectors. Modern 
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sectors tend to be viewed as success stories and national champions – even if their 
success is a direct result of significant trade barriers – attracting better educated 
executives who are able to articulate their protectionist arguments. Thus, there 
probably is a natural tendency for trade policy makers in developing countries to be 
sensitive to protectionist arguments. This bias toward protectionism, however, is not 
the major difficulty special and differential treatment creates for economic 
development. All countries have to find the appropriate balance in trade policy 
between the gains from trade liberalization and the adjustment costs imposed on 
particular sectors. Developed countries exhibit varying degrees of openness and are 
clearly willing to forgo a certain proportion of the potential gains from trade. 
Isolation from external economic forces represents the major detriment to 
economic development that arises from special and differential treatment. While it is 
true that protected firms do not have to become more competitive, isolation of the 
economy means also that local institutions do not face pressure to modernize. Banks 
and other financial institutions fail to modernize because they do not have to compete 
implicitly with the services provided to foreign firms competing in their domestic 
market. Government bureaucracies can remain inefficient and corrupt because they 
can retain their monopolies over the services they provide. For example, open 
economies mean that domestic firms can seek better government services elsewhere, 
if necessary moving operations to countries whose bureaucracies are less inefficient or 
corrupt and exporting back to their original country of operation. The need to respond 
to the potential for firms to “flee” puts considerable pressure on domestic policy 
makers to initiate reforms. Considerable evidence of the institutional reforms that 
economic openness can bring is to be found in the experience of transition economies 
(Hobbs et al., 1997). 
In those Central and Eastern European countries that were geographically 
contiguous with countries of the European Union, and were seeking membership in 
the EU, economic openness was a requirement. That meant, for example, that Czech 
firms that could not get modern banking services from domestic banks had the option 
to obtain financing from Germany. While there were transaction costs associated with 
dealing with German banks, they were less than the costs imposed by the inefficiency 
of local banks. As a result, the efficiency of domestic banks improved dramatically. 
This has not been the experience in the economies of countries such as Ukraine, 
Moldova or Georgia, which are geographically separated from western Europe and do 
not have to open their economies due to the near-term prospect of accession to the EU 
(Gaisford et al., 2003; Considine and Kerr, 2002). 
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Further, opening an economy to foreign competition also allows for corporate 
raids to be made on poorly performing assets in the developing country. If foreign 
firms see opportunities for reforming domestic enterprises so that they can receive a 
better return on their investment than the local management can provide, they will 
acquire the assets and initiate reforms. While this loss of local control is often decried 
by those opposed to globalization, the threat of a foreign takeover is a major spur to 
other domestic firms to reform to stave off potential raiders in the future. Hence, the 
loss of local control in a few instances provides a powerful signal that other domestic 
firms ignore at their peril. These types of reforms lie at the heart of economic 
development. 
In a similar fashion, firms in transition countries bordering western Europe, when 
faced with government corruption and inefficiency, were able to threaten to set up 
shop in Austria or Finland to obtain licences without corruption costs, to have 
transparency in tax regimes and to possess secure property rights and then export via 
short international supply chains to connect with already existing distribution 
networks. As a result, monopolies on government services were indirectly broken and 
those services improved, transparency in tax regimes increased and the rule of law 
replaced bureaucratic largess over rights to property. Strengthening property rights is 
particularly important to the process of economic development. Progress in 
strengthening property rights may be thwarted by those in government who benefit 
directly from their ability to (arbitrarily) allocate rights to use productive resources, 
and economic reforms may stall at suboptimal institutional arrangements (Kerr and 
MacKay, 1997). Openness to foreign alternatives may help tip the balance toward 
further institutional reforms. 
One of the major inhibitors of economic development is high transaction costs 
arising from poorly developed institutions (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). Special and 
differential treatment allows a developing country to choose a general level of 
isolation from outside forces. This isolation increases the ability of governments to 
resist change. In particular, given that economic isolation allows corruption to 
flourish, protectionism may well have new beneficiaries (and new proponents) that 
see special and differential treatment not so much as a mechanism to provide benefits 
to particular private economic interests but rather as a mechanism to allow their 
corrupt practices to continue. 
Hence, in the case of such isolation, it is the positive externalities for economic 
development, rather than the direct benefits of trade, that are forgone. The loss of 
these externalities represents the major danger arising from attempting to associate 
special and differential treatment in a causal way with economic development. In 
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other words, without special and differential treatment, developing-country 
governments would still have industries or sectors they wish to protect and would 
have to negotiate hard to retain the level of protection desired – just like every other 
country. Special and differential treatment, however, allows for a higher general level 
of protective isolation, thus reducing the positive externalities trade can bring to 
development. Legitimizing this additional degree of protectionism in the WTO by 
suggesting it is development enhancing would seem to be counterproductive. 
Sometimes it is argued that while the ability of developing countries to restrict 
market access in the name of special and differential treatment does not contribute to 
development, the important aspect of special and differential treatment is that it allows 
preferred access to the markets of developed countries. Beyond the mercantilist roots 
of this view – “exports are good” – preferential access leads to the same failure to 
adjust that barriers to market access allow. One has only to look at the fate of the EU’s 
banana suppliers that received preferred access to the EU market. Unless preferred 
access, and its inherent distortions, can be maintained in perpetuity, difficult 
adjustments eventually will have to be made (Read, 2001; Guyomard and Le Mouël, 
2003). This is no different from the false development that takes place behind barriers 
to market access. Another example arises as the United States progressively offers 
preferred market access to more countries through bilateral trade agreements, and 
those who first received preferred market access, such as Mexico, attempt to find 
ways to retain their advantage (Kerr, 2005; Yeung et al., 2004). The final dismantling 
of the WTO’s arrangements on fibres, textiles and clothing has seen the erosion of 
many specially granted preferences, primarily protection from competition from 
China, and the likelihood of costly adjustments having to be made. 
While special and differential treatment may be a necessary evil given the higher 
cost of adjustment faced by developing countries if they remove trade barriers, 
dressing it up as a facilitator of development plays into the hands of those who fear 
the reform-fostering externalities that arise from opening economies. This is not a way 
for the WTO to play a positive role in the process of the economic development of its 
members.  
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1.    Many editions of Smith’s classic exist, including Smith (1994). 
2.    See Kerr and Perdikis (1995, pp. 39-56) for a summary of these theories and their 
debunking. 
3.    This is not meant to imply that the neoclassical paradigm has been developed or 
accepted without debate. In fact, the vigorous debate that has accompanied its 
development is one of the sources of its appeal (Perdikis and Kerr, 1998). 
4.   While the neoclassical trade model underpins the broad goals of the WTO, it is 
also clear that the approach taken by the parties in negotiation is often deeply 
rooted in mercantilism, with its emphasis on the desirability of exports and 
minimization of imports. 
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Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy nor the Estey Centre 
for Law and Economics in International Trade. © The Estey Centre for Law and 
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5.    See Leger et al. (1999) for a discussion of the circumstances under which 
temporary trade restrictions may have a legitimate role in dealing with terms-of-
trade shocks. 
6.    Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, 
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